Abstract: The US housing market exhibits seasonal boom and bust cycles where prices and the speed of trade (turnover rate) rise in summers and fall in winters. We present a search model that analytically generates the observed cycles. The proposed mechanism is based on swings in market thickness rather than market tightness, the leading explanation in the literature.
Introduction
The US housing market goes through seasonal boom and bust episodes:-in summers prices rise and trade speeds up whereas in winters prices fall, it takes much longer to sell and the number of sales slides to the annual lows. The cycles are highly predictable and repetitive, seemingly defying the no-arbitrage condition; hence di¢cult to explain with standard frictionless asset pricing models. In an oft cited article Novy Marx (2009) constructs a search model of the housing market to provide rationale for the observed cycles. The idea is that if a season exogenously adds more buyers to the market then the buyer-seller ratio goes up and therefore houses sell more quickly. The housing supply is assumed to be …xed so it reduces rapidly and the buyer-seller ratio increases even further, 1 The panel illustrates seasonal components in sale prices (right axis) and the speed of trade (turnover rate). The patterns show that the market systematically alternates between boom and bust episodes where in summers prices rise and trade speeds up while in winters the trend reverses. The monthly purchase price index comes from the Federal Housing Financing Agency and it is constructed by a version of the weighted-repeat sales methodology proposed by Case and Shiller (1989) . The method controls for di¤erences in the quality of the houses comprising the sample. The speed of trade, on the other hand, is proxied by the ratio of the number of new-single family houses sold at the end of the month divided by the number of houses listed as being for sale that month. The higher the ratio, the higher the speed of trade in that month. The data are obtained from the US Census Bureau and are not seasonally adjusted. We used the X-12-ARIMA procedure, developed by the Census Bureau, to obtain the seasonal factors in each data set. The procedure conducts three formal tests to assess the presence of seasonality: a parametric F-test, a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test and a moving seasonality test based on two way ANOVA. All tests positively indicate that identi…able seasonality is present in both series. which, in turn, leads to higher prices. 2 The mechanism operates through market tightness (buyerseller ratio) and to obtain cycles as in Figure 1 one needs to assume that the buyer-seller ratio rises every summer and falls every winter.
While it is true that there are more potential buyers in summers than in winters, the supply side is hardly …xed-in fact it exhibits the same pattern as the demand side, i.e. there are more houses on sale in summers than in winters. 3 Therefore it is not clear whether or not market tightness-the key parameter of interest in Novy Marx (2009)-indeed increases in summers.
In this letter we propose an alternative mechanism that depends on market thickness (the number of market participants) instead of market tightness (ratio of participants) and is capable of producing deterministic boom and bust cycles. Market thickness refers to the fact that there are more houses on sale in the summer market than in the winter market, hence better quality matches are formed in summers. The thick summer market comes with the greatest possible choice of residence which means that buyers encounter better quality matches in such a market. People are willing to pay a premium for housing that closely matches their needs, tastes and preferences; hence prices go up in the summer. On the other hand, sellers have no means of transferring the extra value across seasons, so they have strong incentives to trade while the market is still thick.
Therefore they limit the price rise to a modest amount to ensure that trade indeed speeds up. The rising prices coupled with the increased speed of trade means that the market booms in the summer.
The trend reverses in the summer, so the market alternates between boom and bust episodes as seasons change.
Model
Time is discrete, in…nite and deterministically alternates between two seasons, summer (s) and winter (w). The economy is populated by a continuum of houses and a continuum of buyers each of whom wishes to purchase a house. In summers there is a measure of h s properties for sale and b s buyers whereas in winters these measures are h w and b w : Each house is owned by a risk neutral seller, who derives no utility from the ownership. Buyers, too, are risk neutral and receive periodic housing services starting the period after the purchase and continuing forever. The measures of potential buyers and sellers are exogenous; however the number of transactions, the speed of trade and sale prices are, of course, endogenous.
2 Krainer (2001) presents an alternative model where the market ‡uctuates between hot and cold episodes, however the model fails to produce deterministic cycles. Indeed if the persistence parameter in Krainer (2001) is set = 0 so that seasons alternate deterministically then, interestingly, one obtains the wrong cycle; the market is cold in the summer and hot in the winter. Ngai and Tenreyro (2013) present a setup generating deterministic cycles, but their results are based on quantitative simulations. See also Kaplanski and Levy (2012) , Muellbauer and Murphy (1997), and Stein (1995) .
3 Rosen (1979) , one of the most comprehensive studies on seasonality in the American housing market, presents substantial evidence documenting seasonal ups and downs in demand and supply in the residential property market and concludes that demand and supply are both high in summers and low in winters. In other words, the seasonality in housing demand coincides with the seasonality in housing supply (housing authorizations, construction of new houses and listings of existing properties). Goodman (1993) , using data from separate sources con…rms Rosen's …ndings.
The market is characterized by two types of frictions. The …rst is …nding a counterpart, which depends on market tightness (buyer-seller ratio). Assuming an urn-ball matching function and letting x := b x =h x denote the buyer-seller ratio in season x = s; w, a seller meets a buyer with probability 1 e x whereas a buyer meets a seller with probability 1 e x = x : Assumption 1. We have s = w = : Furthermore h s > h w . The mechanism in Novy Marx (2009) operates through market tightness, x ; so, for exposition, we shut down this channel by assuming that x remains constant throughout the year. The second part of the assumption is based on the aforementioned empirical …ndings by Rosen (1979) and Goodman (1993) and states that in summers there are more houses on the market than in winters.
The second friction deals with whether the house turns out to be a good match. After an initial inspection, the buyer realizes his valuation v 2 [0; 1] ; which is private information and a random draw via cdf F (v; h x ) F x (v). From the buyer's perspective the search process amounts to …nding a high enough v: The cdf F depends on the stock of the vacant houses h x and we assume that the larger this stock the more likely are buyers to …nd what they are looking for.
In addition, the "Iso-Probability Curve"
increases and is strictly convex. 4 Finally we assume that the survival function
8v and x = s; w: 5 Likelihood ratio dominance implies …rst order stochastic dominance (FOSD), F s (v) < F w (v) ; as well as hazard rate dominance, s (v) < w (v) ; where x := f x =S x : FOSD implies that, controlling for the probability of trade, higher quality matches are formed in summers since the house stock 4 The strict convexity of is added as an extra assumption, but under certain circumstances likelihood ratio dominance is a su¢cient condition for it; for instance if f 0 x 0 and f 0 x 0 with one inequality strict. 5 Log-concavity is a mild assumption satis…ed by well known distributions; see Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005). in summers exceeds the one in winters (recall that h s > h w ).
Figure 2 -CDFs and the Iso-Probability Curve
Discussion. Before proceeding further, two points are worth discussing. First, we treat the stocks of market participants exogenously, i.e. we do not seek to explain why the number of potential buyers and sellers are higher in summers than in winters. Based on the empirical studies mentioned in the Introduction we take the seasonal stocks as given and then explain how the equilibrium price and the speed of trade (turnover rate) rise in summers and fall in winters as a result. A more complete model should treat these stocks endogenously and this letter should be viewed as a …rst step towards that goal.
Second, Assumptions 1 and 2 do not immediately imply the results. The assumption that
h s > h w may imply that there will be more trade in summers than in winters; however the turnover rate (speed of trade) is the ratio of the number of houses sold to the number of houses on sale.
Both the numerator and the denominator rise in summers; thus the change in the turnover rate is ambiguous. Similarly, a priori it is hard to predict how the equilibrium price would change across seasons since there are always buyers per seller in the market.
Analysis
The valuation v is a buyer's private information, so the seller quotes the same take-it-or-leave-it price p x for all customers. Letting x denote the value of search to a buyer in season x = s; w we
With probability 1 e = the buyer meets a seller. If he purchases he gets v=(1
If he walks away he obtains x ; which is the discounted value of search in the next season. With the complementary probability he does not encounter a seller and moves on to the next season. We
where := 1 e (1 ) 2 (1 + ) and
For any given price p x there is a threshold reservation value v x satisfying
For trade to occur the house must turn out to be a good match, which happens with probability
Substituting x into the indi¤erence condition (1) one gets the 'indi¤erence curves' I s and I w
The value function of a seller is given by
With probability 1 e the seller meets a buyer, with probability S x (v x ) the buyer agrees to purchase and the seller obtains price p x . With the complementary probability trade does not materialize, so the seller moves to the next season. The seller quotes p x in season x taking as given the indi¤erence condition (1) i.e.
treating x and x exogenously. The FOC is given by
If S x is log concave then the second order condition holds; hence the FOC yields a maximum. 6
Straightforward algebra yields pro…t maximizing prices P s and P w that a seller ought to post:
Simultaneous intersections of the o¤er and indi¤erence curves determine the equilibrium. More formally a steady-state, stationary and symmetric equilibrium is characterized by the pairs v = (v s ; v w ) and p = (p s ; p w ) satisfying indi¤erence (1) and pro…t maximization (3)
Proposition 1 An equilibrium exists and it is unique.
The proof amounts to showing that there exists a unique pair v = (v s ; v w ) 2 (0; 1) 2 satisfying
The details of the proof are relegated to the Online Appendix.
Deterministic Cycles
We now show that the equilibrium price and speed of trade together rise in summers and fall in winters. The speed of trade is typically proxied by the turnover rate, i.e. the number of homes sold divided by the number of homes listed; e.g. Goodman (1993) , Rosen (1979) . In our model season
x comes with h x houses for sale, of which 1 e h x S x are sold; thus the turnover rate equals to
Since is the same in both seasons (Assumption 1) we simply focus on the probability of sale S x to compare turnover rates. Our goal, therefore, is to show that in equilibrium p s > p w and S s > S w .
Proposition 2 The equilibrium price and the speed of trade are both high in the summer and low in the winter i.e. p s > p w and S s > S w : So, we have a booming market (high prices and fast sales)
in the summer and a declining market (low prices, slower sales) in the winter. In addition, sellers and buyers are strictly better of trading immediately rather than waiting for the next season.
The proof is in the Online Appendix. The thick summer market presents the largest number of possible housing alternatives. Buyers, on average, encounter higher quality matches in such a market, so they are ready to pay more. This is why prices go up in the summer. On the other hand, sellers cannot transfer the additional value across seasons, so they wish to trade while the market is still thick. To do so, they limit the price rise to a modest amount making sure that trade 6 Basic algebra yields sign (
The expression inside the parenthesis on the rhs of the equality is positive because of log concavity; hence 00 x is negative. indeed speeds up in the summer. 7 In the winter, the scenario is reversed; so we have a setup where the market deterministically alternates between boom and bust episodes.
This brings us to a crucial question: Why do not buyers wait until the winter to obtain better deals or why do not sellers wait until the summer to obtain better prices? The reason is that the market operates via search and matching, so an agent may not be able to meet a counter-part in the next season. Plus, even if a counter-part is found, there is no guarantee that a sale will occur as the quality of the new match may not be high enough. Therefore, assuming a suitable match is found, agents are strictly better o¤ trading immediately.
Numerical Example. To provide further insight we run a numerical simulation based on the following parameter values: Table 1 The parameters yield equilibrium prices p s = 6:26; p w = 6:17 and probabilities of trade S s = 0:37; The …rst two rows report equilibrium objects under the regular model. The third row is calculated under the assumption that the market remains thick throughout the entire year, i.e. if Fw(v) were the same as Fs(v): The equilibrium price in this imaginary scenario exceeds the summer price in the regular model. As argued above, sellers in the regular model do not raise prices su¢ciently as they want to take advantage of the summer market while it lasts. 8 Solving s = 0 and w = 0; where x is given by (4), yields v s = 0:796 and v w = 0:791, which means that S s = 0:37 and S w = 0:21: Substituting v s = 0:8 and v w = 0:79 into (3) yields prices p s = 6:27 and p w = 6:17: At the end of the season 0.23 houses are sold. The turnover rate (i.e. the speed of trade), thus equals to 23%. In winters 0.8 houses are put up for sale (each priced at p w = 6:17), of which, 0.10 are sold. Despite lower prices, the turnover rate is only 12.5%.
Discussion and Conclusion
We have presented a setup that generates deterministic boom and bust cycles. The proposed mechanism operates through market thickness rather than market tightness (unlike Novy Marx (2009)) and the results are analytic (unlike Ngai and Tenreyro (2013) ). Finally, although the discussion so far revolved around the housing market, the model is applicable to other search and matching settings, such as the used car market or, to some extent, the labor market, that go through similar seasonal cycles
Online Appendix -Not intended for publication
The following Lemmas are useful in proving existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Lemma 1 We have @I x =@v x > 0 and @I x =@vx > 0; where I x is given by (2).
Proof of Lemma 1. Note that
Clearly both expressions are positive; hence indi¤erence curves I s and I w are upward sloping wrt v s and v w .
Lemma 2 We have dP x =dv x < dPx=dv x < 0; for x = s; w where P x is given by (3).
Proof of Lemma 2. Observe that
where
; which is positive because of log concavity (Assumption 2); thus both derivatives are negative. Furthermore
which is negative because M x is positive.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof amounts to showing that there exists a unique pair v = (v s ; v w ) 2 (0; 1) 2 satisfying
In equilibrium the di¤erence function D := s w must equal to zero as well. Note that
For expositional purposes we will focus on w and D. Below we show that the locus of w is downward sloping whereas the locus of D is upward sloping. The equilibrium v lies at their
intersection. In what follows we omit the superscript when understood. 
Observe that
which is negative because @P w =@v s < 0 (Lemma 2) and @ s =@v s = S s (v s ) < 0: Similarly one can show that @ w =@v w < 0; hence dl =dv s < 0:
Now turn to the di¤erence function D. Recall that D = T 1 + T 2 , where T 1 and T 2 are de…ned in (6). Substitute for P s ; P w ; s and w and simplify to obtain
Ss (vs) s ( vs) io and (7) 
1
(1 e ) (1+ ) S s (v s ) < 0 and
The signs of @T 1 =@v s ; @T 1 =@v w ; @T 2 =@v s and @T 2 =@v w imply that dl D =dv s is indeed positive.
Q.E.D. To see whyṽ w < v w note that
Recall that D = s w : Since D (0;ṽ w ) = 0 it follows that w (0;ṽ w ) equals to s (0;ṽ w ) ; and therefore, positive: On the other hand, recall that w (0; v w ) = 0: Since w decreases in v w , it follows thatṽ w < v w : Q.E.D.
Based on Claims 2 and 3 we draw l D and l in Figure 4 . A visual inspection reveals that under all scenarios the curves intersect once in the unit interval, hence the equilibrium exists and it is unique. For the precision minded reader, below we make this argument clear. The next Lemma says that the locus of T 1 = P s P w = 0; denoted by (the "iso-price curve") looks as in Figure 5 , which in turn will be useful in proving the main result of the paper, Proposition 2. Lemma 3 There exists a unique point A = V s ; V w on the iso-probability curve such that Recall that T 1 = P s P w : The locus of T 1 (v s ; v w ) = 0 is the iso-price curve and it is given by (v s ) = fv w : T 1 (v s ; v w ) = 0g :
9 To see this note that dF The Implicit Function Theorem asserts that
Recall that @T 1 =@v s is negative while @T 1 =@v w is positive (see (9)). Hence d =dv s is positive.
To see that intersect with the iso-probability curve at point A recall that at A we have f s V s = f w V w and S s V s = S w V w ; therefore s V s = w V w : Substituting these equalities into (7) yields T 1 V s ; V w = 0; hence A belongs to : (7), to obtain
which is positive because s (v) < w (v) and S s (v) > S w (v) for all v. The former relationship is the hazard rate dominance and the latter is the FOSD: Recall that Finally, we show that point A lies underneath l D and l : The …rst relationship immediately follows from the facts that A belongs to and that lies below l D : The claim that A lies below l is also easy to verify. Substitute A = V s ; V s into w , given by (5), and simplify the expression using the fact that f s V s = f w V w and S s V s = S w V w to obtain w V s ; V w > 0: This implies that A lies underneath l since the function w is positive at any point underneath its locus l :
Proof of the Proposition 2. The arguments below are best understood with the aid of Figure  5 . First we show that p s > p s . Note that at any point (v s ; v w ) above the iso-price curve we have P s (v s ; v w ) > P w (v s ; v w ) 10 , so we want to show that the equilibrium point v falls above : Recall that v lies at the intersection of l D and l ; so, by de…nition, v belongs to curve l D : Recall also that l D lies above the iso-price curve (Lemma 3). Therefore P s (v s ; v w ) > P w (v s ; v w ) :
Now we turn to the claim that S s > S w : Our objective is to show that v falls inside the isoprobability curve : The curve l is downward sloping whereas l D is upward sloping and point A lies beneath both (Lemma 3). This means that point v must lie above point A; that is v w > V w ; so the region below V w can be dismissed as it cannot contain the equilibrium.
We now claim that along the border of lying above V w the function D = T 1 + T 2 is negative. Recall that at point A = V s ; V w we have f s V s = f w V w : The strict convexity of (Assumption 2) also ensures that f s (V s ) > f w (V w ) for all (V s ; V w ) on lying above A. Along such points the function T 1 is negative. To see why substitute (V s ; V w ) into (7) and use the fact that S s (V s ) = S w (V w ) to obtain T 1 (V s ; V w ) = 1 + 1 e S s (V s ) S s (V s ) n 1 fs(Vs) 1 fw (Vw) o :
The expression is negative because f s (V s ) > f w (V w ). Now focus on T 2 , given by (8), and note that Since v > v x it follows that v=(1 ) p x exceeds x and therefore the buyer is strictly better o¤ by purchasing right away. Now turn to sellers. If a seller decides to sell in the current season x, he obtains price p x : If he waits he obtains the the present value remaining on the market in the next season x : Recall that
The expression on the right hand side is positive for all v x ; hence p x > x : Said di¤erently, sellers, too, are better o¤ trading immediately. This completes the proof.
